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REVIEW OP RECENT COURT DECISIONS 
AFFECTING THE OIL AND GAS INDUSTRY
I have revised the subject topic as shown in the program to add the 
word "recent", so that it reads, "Review of Recent Court Decisions 
Affecting the Oil and Gas Industry.” The title shown in the program is 
somewhat open-ended and reminds me of a recent "decision” of Judge 
George Rose Smith of our Supreme Court. The litigation began as a 
simple suit In ejectment, but the defendant entered a very novel and 
sweeping defense, citing an act of the previous Legislature providing: 
"All laws and parts of laws are hereby repealed." As you know, it is 
customary for legislative acts to include a repealing clause In the 
standard language: "All laws or parts of laws in conflict herewith are 
hereby repealed." Apparently, in its haste to adjourn or to do something 
else, the Legislature In one instance had omitted the words "in conflict 
herewith." Acceding to the recent clamor that Courts stop usurping 
Legislatures, Mr. Justice Smith held that the language of the statute was 
plain; that the Court was bound to carry out the legislative intent; and 
that its effect was simply to repeal all of the statutory and case law in 
the State of Arkansas. Needless to say, there was great consternation 
among the bench and bar until someone remembered that the day the opinion 
was rendered was April 1. Then someone else, having some knowledge of 
French, recognized that the style of the case, "Poisson v. D ’Avril", 
means "Fish of April", or, in our idiom, April Fool!
In looking back through past volumes of the Institute proceedings, 
for which we are all deeply indebted to Murphy Oil Corporation, I notice 
that the topic, "Recent Developments in Oil and Gas Law”, has become an 
annual one, and in fact, at one Institute, there were two talks having 
that identical subject, back to back.
The format of this presentation generally has assumed a reference 
to the recent Arkansas decisions and then some comments on recent decisions 
from other jurisdictions.
During 1971, the Arkansas Supreme Court decided only one case of 
special interest in the mineral field, Helms v. Vaughn, 250 Ark. 828,
457 S.W.2d 399. Two brothers had acquired a royalty interest in 1947.
On December 27, 1963, one of the partners executed an instrument styled 
"Release", by which he purported to "release, remise, relinquish, and 
surrender all of his right, title and interest in" the royalty, etc.
Suit was filed by the landowners claiming that the interest released 
vested in them. The Court held, however, that since there was no 
grantee named in the deed, it was void for want of a necessary party and 
further that there was no abandonment, since minerals in place constitute 
real property and can only be relinquished in circumstances of estoppel 
or adverse possession. Since there was no evidence of any reliance by 
the land owners upon the alleged abandonment so as to create an estoppel 
nor evidence of adverse possession, the Court found that the deed was 
a nullity and title was quieted in the defendants.
While the opinion does not so state, it is possible that the 
mineral owner executed the instrument in question for the purpose of
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establishing a tax loss and that when the minerals later became valuable, 
he changed his mind about disposing of them. However, it is not the tax 
consequences that interest us at the moment, but rather the statement by 
the Court of the technical requirements of conveyancing, "including the 
necessity for a grantee in a deed for it to be operative and the basic 
rule that title to minerals in place cannot be lost by abandonment, except 
where the elements of estoppel or the statute of limitations are present.
The other Arkansas case of interest decided in 1971 is Mining 
Corporation of Arkansas v. International Paper Company, 324 F .Supp. 705.
The case was tried to Senior District Judge John E. Miller, surely one 
of the outstanding jurists in all of the history of the State of 
Arkansas.
The question was whether cinnabar, or mercury, was included in a 
1911 reservation of "all minerals, coal, oil, or gas." The mother case 
in this field is Missouri Pacific Railroad Company v. Strohacker, 202 
Ark. 645, 152 S.W.2d 557. For a complete discussion of the Strohacker 
case and the subsequent decisions, see "Strohacker Revisited - a Problem 
in Mineral Conveyancing", 1st Annual Arkansas Oil and Gas Institute 
(1962). Briefly, the question presented in the Strohacker line of cases 
is what specific minerals are included in the general term "minerals."
Judge Miller aptly summed up the ruling of the cases that the 
term "minerals" only includes "those minerals known to exist in the 
general area of the land embraced in the deed at that time. The factual 
question of whether cinnabar was a mineral known to be present in Clark 
County in 1911 was decided upon governmental reports, clearly proving that 
cinnabar, or mercury, was first discovered in Arkansas in about 1930 or 1933
Because of the Strohacker rule, which oftentimes defeats the real 
intent of the parties, a broad form of reservation has been devised and 
is in limited use in South Arkansas. While it is not perfect and should 
always be used in the light of each given situation, it is usually in 
the following language:
"The grantors except from this conveyance and reserve 
unto themselves, their heirs and assigns, all of the oil, gas, 
distillate, condensate, iron, bauxite, copper, zinc, tin, barite, 
gold, silver, silica, salt water, and all other minerals, whether 
like or unlike those described, including all substances which 
are not now, but which may in the future be classified as 
minerals, together with the right of ingress and egress for 
the purpose of mining, exploring for, producing, saving, trans- 
porting, and marketing any of the aforesaid minerals."
The Strohacker question has arisen in South Arkansas in recent
years in connection with the production of bromine from salt water.
For a discussion of those problems, see "Legal Aspects Relative to
Bromine," 8th Annual Oil & Gas Institute, 1969.
A variation of the Strohacker problem was presented last year to
the Supreme Court of Texas in Acker v. Guinn, Involved was a 1941 deed
conveying "an undivided one-half interest in and to all of the oil, gas
and other minerals in and under and that may be produced from" a tract
in Cherokee County, Texas. The question was whether the grant included
an interest in a surface deposit of iron ore. The Court, in effect,
rejected the reasoning of the Strohacker case and approved the reasoning
°f Professor Kuntz in his article, "The Law Relating to Oil and Gas in
Wyoming", 3 Wyom. Law. Rev. 107. Professor Kuntz had suggested that
the courts were mistakenly attempting to discover and give effect to an
intention to include or exclude a specific substance from the grant or
reservation. Rather, he said:
”The intention sought should be the general intent, rather than any 
supposed, but unexpressed, specific intent, and, further, that 
general intent should be arrived at, not by defining and re-defining 
the terms used, but by considering the purposes of the grant or 
reservation i n terms of manner of enjoyment intended in the ensuing 
interests."
He then sets out the general approach to be made:
"When a general grant or reservation is made of all minerals without 
qualifying language, it should be reasonably assumed that the parties 
intended to sever the entire mineral estate from the surface estate, 
leaving the owner of each with definite incidence of ownership 
enjoyable in distinctly different manners. The manner of enjoy-
ment of the mineral estate is through extraction of valuable sub- 
atances, and the enjoyment of the surface is through the retention 
of such substances as are necessary for the use of the surface, and 
these respective modes of enjoyment must be considered in arriving 
at the proper subject matter for each estate."
The Texas Court, following Professor Kuntz's reasoning,
concluded:
"Unless the contrary intention is affimati v e l y  and fairly 
expressed, therefore, a grant or reservation of 'minerals'
or 'mineral rights’ should not be construed to include a substance 
that must be removed by methods that will, in effect, consume or 
deplete the surface estate."
The Supreme Court of Texas referred to Carson v, Missouri Pacific 
Railroad Co.,212 Ark. 963, 209 S.W.2d 97, where the Arkansas Court held 
that bauxite was not included in a 1892 reservation of "all coal and 
mineral deposits", because "(1) bauxite is a clay formation containing 
alumina in small particles; (2) its existence was not known at the time 
the instrument was executed; and (3) the mining of bauxite is generally 
by the open pit method, which would destroy the value of the estate."
It would therefore seem that Arkansas has, in effect, recognized 
both rules and the question now arises as to what approach the Supreme 
Court will take when next confronted with this question. The Court’s 
reluctance to disturb what it sometimes calls "Rules of Property" may be 
a deterent, but it would certainly seem that the better rule is that 
advanced by Professor Kuntz.
One of the most interesting decisions of 1971 was Jolly v. Wilson,
278 Pac.2d 886. In that Oklahoma case the reservation in a deed was:
"However, there is reserved and excepted from this conveyance, 
one-half of one-eighth of all minerals in and under said land, the 
same being reserved and excepted, and said royalty is nonparticipating 
in the lease or lease rentals."
The Court applied the rule that where a reservation contained characteristics 
of both a mineral and a royalty interest, It will be construed to reserve 
that interest whose characteristics are more clearly described, and, it 
said, the language "minerals in and under" the land clearly indicated a 
mineral interest and overcame the provision "said royalty is nonparticipa- 
ting In the lease or delay rentals", particularly where there was out-
standing oil and gas lease. The Court adopted the approach that the 
elements of ownership of minerals as opposed to the elements of ownership
of royalty furnish a key to the proper construction of the language and 
thus the intent of the parties. As a preliminary to this discussion the 
court pointed out a summary of factors to be considered in distinguishing 
whether a mineral or royalty interest reservation is made from 9 Okla.
Law Rev. 139 as follows:
"(1) If the interest conveyed or retained is of the oil and 
gas in and under the land, a mineral interest is indicated. On 
the other hand, if the interest conveyed is in oil and gas to be 
produced, a royalty interest may be the result.
"(2) Who has the right to grant leases, and to receive bonuses 
and rentals? If it is the grantee of the interest, a mineral 
interest is created. If not, a royalty or nonparticipating mineral 
interest may be the result.
"(3) If the right of ingress and egress and of exploration is 
granted, the interest conveyed is mineral not royalty.
”(4) If there is an oil and gas lease in existence at the time 
the deed is made, the word ’royalty’ when used to describe the 
interest reserved or conveyed, is usually interpreted to mean 
royalty in the restricted sense as a share in production only; but, 
in the absence of an existing lease, ’royalty’ is likely to be 
interpreted in its loose, broad sense to mean a mineral interest.
”(5) If the interest conveyed or retained is 'royalty' in 
its restricted sense, the fractional designation of the quantum of 
interest usually refers to that fractional part of the gross 
production. If the Interest is 'mineral' the fractional designation 
of the quantum conveyed or retained usually entitled the grantee to 
only that fractional part of the lessor's share of production.”
I have copied the summary because it may be of some assistance as a
guide to whether a particular reservation or grant is of minerals or
royalty.
The Oklahoma Court placed great emphasis upon the fact that the 
reservation used the language "minerals in and under the land." That 
language, clearly indicating a mineral estate, was sufficient to overcome 
what the Court said was ambiguous language, "said royalty is
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nonparticipating in the lease or lease rentals.” The Court said that the 
use of the term "royalty" was weakened by the fact that the land was not 
and never had been under lease. It disposed of the statement that the 
interest was nonparticipating in "the lease or lease rentals" by saying 
that the parties could have meant that the owner of the interest would 
not participate in the lease bonus and lease rentals without regard to 
the executive right or the necessity to execute the lease.
I am inclined to disagree with the holding of the Court. The 
Language "minerals in and under said lands" is more often used as a 
formal, legalistic expression. It seems to me that the real intent 
of the parties is better arrived at by looking at the specific and 
unusual language which they use, rather than legal formalities. To me, 
one of the most significant keys to the intent of the parties is the fact 
that they reserved "one-half of one-eighth." This is clearly a reference 
to the u s u a l  one-eighth royalty provided in leases. If the parties had 
merely intended to reserve a one-sixteenth of the oil, gas and minerals 
in place, as the Court held, they would normally have expressed it in 
One f r a c t i o n ,  "one-sixteenth", rather than expressing it in a double 
fraction. c f . Longino v. Machen (1950) 217 Ark. 64l, 232 S.W.2d 826.
Furthermore, the use of the term "said royalty" is an express 
description by the parties of the interest with which they are dealing. 
word "nonparticipating", however hazy its origins may be, has come to
a recognized meaning, and is certainly consistent with the use of 
t he word "royalty." See "Non-Participating Royalty", 5th Annual Ark.
Oil & Gas Institute (1966).
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While it is technically true that the executive rights may be 
separated from rights to participate in bonus and rentals, as a 
practical matter, this is not a desirable situation. If, as the Court 
holds, the owner of this reserved interest is not entitled to participate 
in the lease bonus, but is required to sign the lease, those of you who 
have had some experience in getting leases signed by parties who will not 
receive any money will immediately recognize the practical problem. Thus, 
the Oklahoma Court held that instead of being entitled to one-half of the 
one-eighth royalty under any future lease, "nonparticipating", the grantor 
had a one-sixteenth mineral interest which, when leased, would entitle 
him to 1/128 of the production as a royalty, rather than 1/16 , without 
participation in the bonus or rentals, but with the necessity for 
executing the lease. In other words, if the interest owner is not 
entitled to participate in the lease bonus, it is inconsistent to say that 
he is a necessary party to the lease; and if he is not a necessary party 
t0 the lease, then It is inconsistent to say that the interest he owns is 
a mineral interest. It is submitted that the decision of the Court is based 
upon the use of technical rules of construction, rather than special 
language the parties purposely used to describe the Interest they were 
attempting to create.
One other case decided in 1971 should be mentioned, It also being 
a decision of the Oklahoma Supreme Court. In Beaton v. Pure Oil Co. ,
463 Pac.2d 1145, four grantors who collectively owned the full mineral 
fee made a deed containing a warranty clause which undertook to convey 
"an undivided__________interest" In forty acres. The lower Court held
that the deed conveyed the entire mineral interest of the grantors.
The Court of Appeals held the existence of the word "undivided" 
suggested something less than all, and that the blank created an 
ambiguity that could be resolved by extrinsic, parol evidence and that 
since such evidence could not be introduced because of the Statute of 
Frauds, the deed was therefore void. The Supreme Court affirmed the 
first decision, holding that the deed conveyed all of the interest of 
the grantors, relying heavily upon an Oklahoma statute, 16 O.S. 1961, §19,
that a warranty deed conveyed to the grantee the entire interest of the 
grantor. While Arkansas does not have a statute identical to that of 
Oklahoma, there has long been case law to the same effect. In Patterson 
v. Miller, 154 Ark. 124, 24l S.W. 875, the Arkansas Court said:
"There is a presumption, of course, that a grantor intends to 
convey his entire interest by his deed, and such is the effect of 
the deed which does not limit the interest conveyed."
A harder case, of course, would be made if the grantor owned less than
the full mineral fee and purported to convey "an undivided _________
interest" in oil, gas and minerals. That, of course, differs from a deed
conveying "my undivided _______ interest." I have not found any direct
authority, but I would be inclined to think that, particularly if a
printed form were used, and the language was "an undivided ______  .
interest", the Court should treat that as ambiguous or imcomplete and 
permit the introduction of parol testimony to determine what interest 
was intended to be conveyed. Usually, of course, there are other keys 
in the instrument, such as the common expression of an intention to convey
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a certain number of mineral or royalty acres.
I appreciate-the honor of this traditional task of mentioning some 
of the recent decisions, and I look forward with you to another instructive 
and enjoyable Institute.
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